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THE RELATIVE RELEVANCE OF BANKRUPTCY: 
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR MARTIN 
Daniel Keating* 
INTRODUCTION 
Professor Nathalie Martin has spent a good part of her academic career 
“helping consumers avoid the many traps and pitfalls created by the current 
consumer credit world . . . .”1 Between her voluminous cutting-edge scholarship 
on consumer law issues2 and her many years teaching courses such as 
Bankruptcy, Consumer Law, and Financial Literacy, she brings a rare 
combination of deep expertise in both bankruptcy and consumer law. Professor 
Martin’s passion for and knowledge of the intersection of consumer law and 
bankruptcy law are each ably demonstrated in her excellent and thoughtful 
article, Bringing Relevance Back to Consumer Bankruptcy. 
Although lacking Professor Martin’s sophistication on the consumer law 
side of things, I nevertheless share her obvious frustration with the economic 
and income stratification that we both can see on full display in our society 
today. This widening gap between the haves and the have-nots seemingly 
worsens with each passing year.3 I also share Professor Martin’s desire to find 
solutions to this crisis through some form of intervention, whether that be 
legislative, administrative, or market-based. Her article suggests that certain 
changes in the Bankruptcy Code (Code) might effectively address some of the 
ways that bankruptcy law has failed many economically marginalized debtors. 
 
 * I would like to thank the following individuals for their helpful comments (some of them quoted in this 
response piece) on the issue of the relevance of consumer bankruptcy law today: Darrell Clark, Emily Cohen, 
Danielle D’Onfro, Robert Eggmann, David Farrell, Dave Going, Sandra Louis, T.J. Mullin, Judge Barry 
Schermer, Wendell Sherk, Judge Kathy Surratt-States, and Cynthia Kern Woolverton. I would also like to thank 
my fellow panelists Pamela Foohey, David Lander, and Nathalie Martin for their interesting insights on this 
issue. 
 1 Professor Nathalie Martin, UNIV. OF N.M., http://lawschool.unm.edu/faculty/martin/index.html. 
 2 See, e.g., Nathalie Martin & Robert Mayer, What Communities Can Do to Rein In Payday Lending: 
Strategies for Successful Local Ordinance Campaigns Through a Texas Lens, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 
(2017); Nathalie Martin, Giving Credit Where Credit is Due: What We Can Learn from the Banking and Credit 
Habits of Undocumented Immigrants, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 989 (2015); Nathalie Martin & Max Weinstein, 
Addressing the Foreclosure Crisis through Law School Clinics, 20 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 531 (2013). 
 3 See, e.g., Chad Stone, et al., A Guide to Statistics on Historical Trends in Income Inequality, CTR. ON 
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/research/poverty-and-inequality/a-guide-
to-statistics-on-historical-trends-in-income-inequality (noting that beginning the 1970s, “[i]ncome growth for 
households in the middle and lower parts of the distribution slowed sharply, while incomes at the top continued 
to grow strongly.”). 
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Because my assignment is to be a commentator on Professor Martin’s article, 
I am assuming that my role is primarily to highlight where my views might differ 
from hers or where I might add insights that she may have omitted. Having said 
that, I want to reiterate at the beginning of my comments that I learned many 
valuable new insights from her article, that I thoroughly enjoyed reading it, and 
that I agreed with much, if not most, of what she had to say. 
Whether or not Professor Martin’s prescriptions for bankruptcy reform will 
make bankruptcy more relevant depends a lot on the accuracy of empirical 
assumptions and predictions that underlie her article—assumptions about the 
characteristics of the current consumer debtor population as well as predictions 
about how her reforms would affect the future behavior of both debtors and 
creditors. Because I have had so little connection to the real world of consumer 
bankruptcy practice, I thought that in preparing my response it would probably 
be helpful to me (and ultimately to Professor Martin) to share Professor Martin’s 
article with people I know who work in the consumer bankruptcy practice area. 
The group from which I sought some “real world” perspective included: two 
federal bankruptcy judges, one chapter 7 and chapter 13 standing trustee, one 
career law clerk to a federal bankruptcy judge, one former attorney advisor for 
the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, one bankruptcy 
lawyer who does mostly business but some consumer bankruptcy, and four 
lawyers who do primarily or exclusively consumer bankruptcy work. I was 
fortunate to receive written responses from each member of this group except 
for one lawyer who responded to me by phone call. Collectively, these responses 
served as a “reality check” to my own reactions to the various proposals put forth 
in Professor Martin’s article. Where appropriate, I will note (and even quote) 
some of the more insightful comments that I received from this group.  
To be clear, I do not pretend that this very informal survey is in any sense an 
“empirical study.” Even if I had been afforded much more time than the one 
month that I was given to prepare this response, it is highly doubtful that I could 
have designed and executed a meaningful empirical study that could have 
reliably tested some of the empirical questions raised by Professor Martin’s 
article. Be that as it may, even these anecdotal insights that I received from very 
experienced professionals in the field proved quite useful to me as I pondered 
my own reactions to the proposals contained in the article by Professor Martin. 
With those preliminary thoughts out of the way, let me now proceed by first 
outlining the two “big picture” concerns that I had with the article and then by 
sharing my thoughts and comments on some of Professor Martin’s more specific 
proposals for reform. 
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I. SOME THOUGHTS ON THE BIG PICTURE 
Even the so-called “big picture” disagreements I have about the article may 
go more to the degree of Professor Martin’s claims in the article than to the 
essence of what she is asserting. First, I have to quibble with Professor Martin’s 
thesis, at least as it is stated in the opening sentence of her article, where she 
states, “Consumer bankruptcy has become . . . irrelevant.”4 That is a bold 
statement indeed, and I appreciate that we both work in an industry—the legal 
academy—where we are taught from a young, professional age to be bold, even 
perhaps at the risk of over-claiming. After all, how many untenured professors 
write law review articles whose stated goal is to make merely some modest 
contribution to the existing literature at the margin rather than to offer an entirely 
novel “paradigm-shifting” insight? 
While I cannot sign on to Professor Martin’s thesis as stated above, I could 
easily be persuaded by a more nuanced statement of the same thesis, perhaps 
something along the lines of, “Consumer bankruptcy has become less relevant,” 
or “Consumer bankruptcy has become irrelevant for a certain subset of 
debtors.”5 What the statistics would show us is that consumer bankruptcy filings 
have clearly been on the decline following the passage of Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA).6 What the 
numbers would also show us, however, is that in the most recent calendar year, 
consumer filings in this country well exceeded 500,000, which seems to me a 
number large enough to suggest that bankruptcy is still very relevant for at least 
a nontrivial number of consumer debtors.7 
The cause of the decline in consumer filings may well be due to the features 
of the current bankruptcy law that Professor Martin’s article proposes to remedy. 
 
 4 Nathalie Martin, Bringing Relevance Back to Consumer Bankruptcy, 36 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 581 
(2020).  
 5 As one of my consumer bankruptcy lawyer respondents put it, “I think her article should be called 
‘Bringing Relevance Back to Consumer Bankruptcy for the Middle Class or Upper Middle Class.’” This lawyer 
continued, “In my experience, those who are truly in need of debt relief do not own houses or cars (remember I 
live in a city with a strong metro system). Also, nearly all do not have large student loans. I think what she is 
really arguing is that bankruptcy is less available for a certain segment of the population that purchased a new 
car or a home or purchased an expensive degree.” Email from Anonymous Consumer Bankruptcy Lawyer to 
author (Jan. 8, 2020) (on file with author). 
 6 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. L. 109-8, 119 
Stat. 23 (2005). Consumer bankruptcy filings were at just over 1.5 million in 2010, but in 2018 had fallen to 
about half of that number. See Andrew Keshner, Bankruptcy Filings are at a 10-year Low, but not for the 
Reasons You Might Think, MARKETWATCH (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/bankruptcy-
filings-are-at-a-10-year-low-but-thats-not-necessarily-good-news-2019-01-07. 
 7 See Keshner, supra note 6.  
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I would suggest, however, that there are at least two other contributing factors 
to explain the significant drop in filings since BAPCPA. First, the added burdens 
to the debtor and the debtor’s attorney of BAPCPA have so increased the cost 
of a basic consumer bankruptcy filing that many consumers who might have 
otherwise filed bankruptcy before BAPCPA have now been priced out of 
bankruptcy relief.8 Second, thanks to the Affordable Care Act (ACA),9 there are 
probably fewer debtors than before the ACA who must look to bankruptcy to 
discharge significant medical debt. I am not suggesting here that the ACA was 
a panacea in this regard, but only that it probably helped reduce the incidence of 
the so-called “medical bankruptcy” at the margins.10 
In addition to my issue above with the scope of Professor Martin’s thesis, 
my second “big picture” question that I have about the theme of Professor 
Martin’s article is whether the bankruptcy system is best suited, or even well-
suited, to address the systemic income and wealth inequality that clearly troubles 
many of us. My understanding of the role of bankruptcy law in the economy has 
always been that bankruptcy is designed to treat the case of a catastrophic 
economic disruption for the consumer debtor, with the traditional “big three” of 
these disruptions being medical debt, job loss, or divorce.11 Bankruptcy and its 
discharge enable an individual who could otherwise be economically self-
sustaining to wipe their slate clean with respect to whatever one-time financial 
catastrophe has left a sea of debt in its wake. The effect of such a large and 
sudden debt is that the individual’s regular income is suddenly unable to keep 
up with both debt payments and living expenses each month. If bankruptcy, 
however, can discharge this large debt, then the individual is now able to create 
a personal budget that will finally leave them in the black financially. 
Even though consumer bankruptcy and business bankruptcy are quite 
different in many respects, I believe that both types of bankruptcy share a 
common core with respect to their role in allowing either an individual or a 
business to overcome the effects of a non-recurring but major financial setback. 
 
 8 See infra section VI. 
 9 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 et seq. (2010).  
 10 See Kari Paul, Medicaid Expansion Saved 50,000 People from Bankruptcy in Two Years, 
MARKETWATCH (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/medicaid-expansion-saved-50000-
people-from-bankruptcy-in-2-years-2017-11-07 (According to a study that was conducted in part by the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, “Credit score gains due to Medicaid expansion [under the ACA] led to 
50,000 fewer bankruptcies among subprime borrowers in the two years following the reform.”). 
 11 These were the three main precipitating causes of consumer bankruptcy that were cited in the landmark 
book, As We Forgive Our Debtors. See Elizabeth Warren, et al., AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY 
AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA (1989). 
KEATING_7.15.20 7/15/2020 4:01 PM 
2020] RELATIVE RELEVANCE OF BANKRUPTCY 629 
In the chapter 11 casebook that I currently use for my seminar,12 the co-authors 
at the very start of their book present the contrast of two different businesses as 
potential candidates for a chapter 11 reorganization. First, we have the Acme 
Shoe Company, which currently makes a pair of shoes at a cost of $10 and then 
sells each pair for $9.50. Then we have Ernestine and her Copy Shop, a start-up 
business that had been quite successful in its early months until a customer 
slipped and fell on the premises. The customer got a big tort judgment against 
Ernestine’s business and Ernestine had failed to pay her liability insurance, 
which meant that the tort judgment was not covered by insurance. The authors 
of the casebook pose the question to the students, which of these two companies 
is an appropriate candidate for chapter 11 bankruptcy?13 
The short answer to that question is of course supposed to be Ernestine and 
her Copy Shop. Ernestine’s business has proven that, in the absence of this 
massive one-time debt, it can be self-sustaining and is worth more as a going-
concern than it is if liquidated piecemeal. The deeper answer to this question is 
that perhaps Acme Shoe Company is also an appropriate candidate for chapter 
11. However, in order for Acme Shoe Company to be a viable business even 
with the help of chapter 11, the company would need to change the way it does 
business so that it can become economically sustainable. Perhaps that would 
involve figuring out how to cut some needless costs or otherwise finding ways 
to become more efficient and profitable. Perhaps that would mean 
manufacturing some new products or expanding into some different geographic 
markets. But simply filing chapter 11 bankruptcy with nothing more is not going 
to save Acme Shoe Company from its fast-approaching demise. 
What concerns me the most about what I see in our country’s current climate 
of income stratification is that a large segment of the economically marginalized 
population falls into a category that I would describe as “structurally 
unsustainable.” In other words, it seems that a significant portion of our lower-
wage workers simply do not make enough income at their current positions to 
afford what most of us would view as the basic necessities of life: safe housing, 
transportation, child care, food and medical care, not to mention certain other 
traditional features of middle-class life such as travel, entertainment, a pension, 
and money for a child’s college tuition. Bankruptcy, it seems to me, is much 
better at dealing with the one-time economic catastrophe than it is at addressing 
these cases of structural unsustainability. To better address structural 
unsustainability, perhaps we need to look at broader approaches such as income 
 
 12 See Mark S. Scarberry, et al., BUSINESS REORGANIZATION IN BANKRUPTCY (4th ed. 2012). 
 13 Id. at 3–5. 
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tax reform, a more robust social safety net, a higher federal minimum wage, a 
guaranteed income, federally subsidized housing, and similar programs outside 
of the bankruptcy system. 
Granted, just because an individual is currently in a state of structural 
unsustainability does not mean that they cannot change that, either by their own 
efforts, the government’s assistance, or some combination of the two. Just like 
Acme Shoe Company can take a hard look at the way it does business to see if 
it can change in a way that makes it viable, individuals can potentially change 
their own situations through job training, higher education, or even consumer 
education that makes them use what little money they have more efficiently. The 
hard question for me, however, is whether bankruptcy is the vehicle best 
designed for effectively addressing this common category of struggling 
consumer in our current economy. 
Let me now consider three different (and artificially constructed) categories 
of consumer bankruptcy debtors and ask in each case how Professor Martin’s 
proposed reforms would make a bankruptcy filing more useful or relevant. For 
my Category 1 debtor, I will consider what I think of as the classic candidate for 
bankruptcy relief: An individual who could be financially self-sufficient but for 
some catastrophic one-time or random financial event, such as medical debt, 
temporary job loss, or divorce. This debtor has no student loans and they may or 
may not own their own home or their own car, but home or car debt is not their 
issue. Rather, it is their inability to pay the non-recurring but large debt that 
makes them currently unable to pay their bills and their expenses as they come 
due. Their financial situation could best be described as not structurally 
unsustainable, but merely temporarily unsustainable. 
For this Category 1 debtor, the current consumer bankruptcy laws may 
already give them the relief that they need to become financially self-sufficient 
once again. It is possible that some of these Category 1 debtors will be forced to 
file a chapter 13 case instead of a chapter 7 case due to the means test of 
BAPCPA,14 but even a chapter 13 case may ultimately get them out from under 
the catastrophic debt which they need to have discharged in order to make their 
income and expenses balance out again. 
I would submit that for a Category l debtor as I have defined that group, 
Professor Martin’s proposed reforms would not make bankruptcy more relevant 
for them personally. Because their problem is not rooted in large mortgage 
 
 14 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2019). 
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payments and a home of declining value, or large car payments and a car of 
declining value, or large student loan payments, they will likely get the relief 
they need under current bankruptcy law with an eventual discharge of the 
unsecured debt represented by their one-time financial catastrophe. 
My Category 2 consumer debtor is one that I have already described. They 
fall into my “structurally unsustainable” category. Their problem is that their 
current low income simply cannot keep up with the normal expenses of 
independent adult living. Perhaps they were able to run up a lot of credit-card 
debt in the short-term in order to mask temporarily the structurally unsustainable 
nature of their financial situation. And for that, a bankruptcy filing and the 
accompanying discharge of such unsecured debt could give them some short-
term relief from their financial struggles. However, that relief by definition 
would only be short-term given that I am defining this group of consumer 
debtors as simply not making enough income to meet basic expenses even aside 
from any one-time or catastrophic debt. For this group of consumer debtors, 
neither current bankruptcy law nor Professor Martin’s proposed reforms would 
provide much in the way of sustainable relief. 
As I think about why bankruptcy is probably not a viable solution for the 
structurally unsustainable situations faced by many consumer debtors, I am 
reminded of a quote that I include in my Sales casebook15 from Judge Richard 
Posner in an opinion he wrote about the unconscionability doctrine in UCC 
Article 2.16 Judge Posner was reflecting on the limited utility of the 
unconscionability doctrine to help economically marginalized buyers: “Since 
the law of contracts cannot compel the making of contracts on terms favorable 
to one party, but can only refuse to enforce contracts with unfavorable terms, it 
is not an institution that is well designed to rectify inequalities in wealth.”17 I 
would say essentially the same thing about bankruptcy as applied to a consumer 
debtor who simply does not make enough income to meet basic living expenses: 
Since bankruptcy cannot compel employers to pay a higher wage for the 
consumer debtor, but can only discharge their past debts once every eight years, 
it is not an institution that is well designed to rectify inequalities in wealth (or 
income). 
My Category 3 group of consumer debtors would be the ones who would 
most stand to benefit from Professor Martin’s proposed reforms. I am defining 
these debtors as individuals who are unable to meet their basic living expenses 
 
 15 DANIEL KEATING, SALES: A SYSTEMS APPROACH (7th ed. 2020). 
 16 See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2012). 
 17 Amoco Oil Co. v. Ashcraft, 791 F.2d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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mainly due to large mortgage payments, large car payments, and large student 
loan payments. In order for this group to benefit from Professor Martin’s 
proposals, they would need to be in a situation where the secured loan on their 
car or home is currently undersecured by some significant amount. Otherwise, 
the strip down benefit that they would achieve in a chapter 13 filing would not 
serve to lower their payments. In other words, if their home value or car value 
currently equaled or exceeded the outstanding debt for that collateral, then they 
could not expect bankruptcy to bring them financial relief through lower 
monthly payments. 
For my Category 3 debtors who are primarily burdened by large student-loan 
payments, Professor Martin’s proposal would clearly seem to help them. The 
marginal benefit of that help would have to be measured against what the 
consumer debtor could already qualify for by way of nonbankruptcy income-
driven student loan repayment plans.18 A bankruptcy discharge of student loan 
debt has two benefits to the consumer as compared to an income-driven 
repayment plan outside of bankruptcy: first, in the short term, the debtor who 
gets a bankruptcy discharge would not have to make even the lower-than-
standard payment required by a nonbankruptcy income-driven repayment plan; 
and second, in the long term, the debtor with a student-loan discharge would not 
need to worry about the huge tax burden that comes with forgiveness at the end 
of the income-driven repayment period. Under Professor Martin’s proposal, 
consumer debtors would need to wait seven years from the point that they begin 
payments to qualify for the discharge that she recommends, but they could at 
least qualify for the all-important bankruptcy discharge at that time. 
In order for us to meaningfully address the questions of whether, and to what 
extent, Professor Martin’s proposals would make bankruptcy relevant, or more 
relevant, we would need to have a sense of the relative number of consumer 
debtors that fall within these three categories. Even if we had the time and 
resources to do a detailed empirical study, I suspect that the artificial boundaries 
of my categories would become quickly apparent, and most real-life debtors 
would probably fit some combination of the three categories as I have outlined 
them above. Nevertheless, the important unknown here for me is to what extent 
the population of debtors today leans toward the characteristics of my Category 
3 debtor. It would be to that extent—to the extent that today’s debtor population 
resembles my Category 3 debtor—that Professor Martin’s proposals would 
 
 18 See generally The Road to Zero: A Strategic Approach to Student Loan Repayment, ACCESSLEX INST. 
(2020), https://www.accesslex.org/RoadToZero. 
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make consumer bankruptcy more relevant than current bankruptcy law for the 
overall group of more than half a million annual consumer bankruptcy filers. 
II. LIEN-STRIPPING FOR HOME MORTGAGES AND CAR LOANS 
I am generally in agreement with Professor Martin’s proposal to allow lien 
strip downs for a debtor’s primary home mortgage or for a debtor’s car loans. 
As a bankruptcy judge friend of mine put it so succinctly, if the lender were 
forced to do a foreclosure sale outside of bankruptcy on the home or car, all they 
would get in cash is the value of the collateral anyway.19 If the debtor wanted to 
file bankruptcy immediately after such a foreclosure sale they could thereby 
discharge the unsecured deficiency claim, if any, and achieve the functional 
equivalent of a mortgage strip down. The big difference, of course, between 
what a lender gets outside of bankruptcy with a state-law foreclosure in this 
context vs. what the lender gets in a chapter 13 case is the timing of payment: 
immediately in a state-law foreclosure vs. over a five-year period in a chapter 
13 plan. 
Having stated my general agreement with this lien-strip down proposal of 
Professor Martin’s, let me just add a few thoughts on the subject. First, the 
marginal benefit of this proposal will be a function not only of the particular 
debtor’s circumstances (see my three debtor categories above), but also of the 
residential real estate market. Three of my small sample of consumer debtor 
attorneys opined without my asking that in the current residential real estate 
market, a mortgage loan strip down would not be meaningful for most debtors 
who come to see them and are currently paying home mortgages. As one 
consumer bankruptcy lawyer put it,  
The subprime market that existed prior to the crash does not exist in 
this environment. Lending has in fact tightened with underwriting, all 
but eliminating the ‘no doc’ and inflated valuations the country 
experienced in the early 2000s. The national delinquency rate is less 
than 4% while Missouri’s default rate is at approximately 1%.20  
Presumably when the next recession hits and real estate prices drop, this 
proposal of Professor Martin’s would have greater relevance to at least those 
 
 19 Email from Anonymous Bankruptcy Judge to author (Jan. 10, 2020) (on file with author). 
 20 This lawyer noted that “Delinquency rates have fallen to their lowest rate in 25 years, and on a year-
over-year basis, total mortgage delinquencies decreased for all loans outstanding. The delinquency rate 
decreased by 56 basis points for conventional loans, decreased 74 basis points for FHA loans, and decreased 23 
basis points for VA loans.” Seth Welborn, Where Mortgage Delinquency Rates Are Improving Most, DS NEWS 
(Nov. 15, 2019), https://dsnews.com/daily-dose/11-15-2019/delinquency-rate-by-loan-type.  
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debtors who file bankruptcy and want to keep their homes with potentially 
reduced monthly payments. 
My second observation about this lien-strip down proposal is that it would 
add a nontrivial valuation issue to any consumer case where the debtor sought 
the benefits of strip down. This was a point specifically raised by one of my 
bankruptcy lawyer respondents.21 Granted, residential real estate valuation is not 
nearly as complicated as is commercial real estate valuation. Nevertheless, the 
valuation range of any home at any given time can be quite broad. A recent 
personal example is that when my own county recently reassessed my home’s 
value for property-tax purposes, it claimed that in the two-year interval since the 
last assessment the value of my house had risen by forty-seven percent based on 
local “comparable” houses that the assessor’s office had compiled. When I 
challenged that assessment on appeal with my own list of comparable houses, 
the county reduced its reassessment to a much more modest six percent increase 
over its previously assessed value at the last two-year interval. The point is, even 
when it comes to residential real estate values, there is a wide range within which 
the two sides can litigate about valuation with potentially many thousands of 
dollars at stake. That, in turn, could add cost and complication to a consumer 
bankruptcy case as compared to the current no-valuation setting.22 
A third point that was raised by two of my consumer bankruptcy attorney 
friends is that even in the absence of this lien-strip down reform proposal, a 
clever debtor’s lawyer can often achieve the benefits of a lien strip down during 
a time of falling real estate prices. One lawyer focused on the language of the 
current anti-strip down provisions in chapter 13 cases, in which only mortgages 
that are “secured only by the principal residence” are denied strip down 
treatment.23 This lawyer explained, “Since most Deeds of Trust get an 
assignment of insurance proceeds in the event of a fire, a creative judge could 
easily view that as extra collateral and allow a cramdown. I did this 
once . . . when [the mortgage lender] refinanced a home and took chicken coops 
also—[it] saved my guy $60,000 plus interest over time! Got to read those Deeds 
of Trust and think outside the box!”24 
 
 21 Email from Anonymous Consumer Bankruptcy Lawyer to author (Jan. 23, 2020) (on file with author). 
 22 A debtor’s home valuation can still become an issue in a chapter 13 case even without the strip down 
possibility. The bankruptcy court must determine the debtor’s equity in their home as part of a determination of 
how much non-exempt property the debtor owns in a chapter 13 case. However, the valuation stakes in those 
cases tend not to be high given that the typical debtor’s equity in their home does not exceed the relevant 
homestead exemption amount and thus would not be available for creditors anyway. 
 23 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2019). 
 24 Email from Anonymous Consumer Bankruptcy Lawyer to author (Jan. 8, 2020) (on file with author). 
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Another bankruptcy attorney friend of mine suggested an alternative way to 
qualify for strip down even under the current bankruptcy laws: “Regarding the 
strip off/strip down of real estate used as a residence: I never understood why a 
debtor did not simply move in with the in-laws for a few months and establish a 
different residence prior to the bankruptcy. Then, do the strip off of the second 
mortgage or the strip down of the first mortgage in bankruptcy. Then move back 
after discharge.”25 
On the subject of BAPCPA’s rule that eliminated car-lien strip downs for 
any car bought within 910 days of the debtor’s bankruptcy filing,26 one 
consumer bankruptcy lawyer that I contacted suggested that Professor Martin’s 
proposed reform (which I also support) might not actually put more money in 
the debtor’s pocket in many cases that he has recently seen: “I don’t think this 
[proposed repeal by Professor Martin of BAPCPA’s anti-strip down rule for car 
loans] is going to make or break the system as such. With the ‘typical’ middle 
class Ch. 13 case, it simply caused a reduction in the unsecured dividend in order 
to pay for the 910-day car. It was a wealth transfer within the estate but it has 
typically meant a minimal increase in the actual payment required of the debtor 
into the estate.”27 
That same attorney, however, believes that Professor Martin’s proposal on 
stripping down car loans could be significant over time:  
I suspect that [the lack of impact noted above] will change in the 
coming years. We’re seeing auto loans that extend well beyond the 
standard 5-year term to deal with high MSRPs [manufacturer’s 
suggested retail price], far more than typical consumers can reasonably 
afford. The vanishing middle class is causing this creative financing, 
so we get 8-year car loans, which include a chunk of negative equity 
to boot. 
The means test doesn’t account for that well (we only get a deduction 
driven by 60-months of the auto debt service) and cramdown on those 
very costly cars could be critical to making any plan work while 
retaining the car. We can currently set up the plan to pay those long-
term loans on a conduit basis—just keep up the contract payments for 
5-years—but at the contract subprime interest rates instead of ‘Till’ 
rates28 [generally much lower than subprime interest rates]. That may 
 
 25 Email from Anonymous Consumer Bankruptcy Lawyer to author (Jan. 8, 2020) (on file with author). 
 26 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2019). 
 27 Email from Anonymous Consumer Bankruptcy Lawyer to author (Jan. 9, 2020) (on file with author). 
 28 See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 479–80 (2004) (holding that the interest rate to which a 
secured creditor is entitled in a chapter 13 plan is not the creditor’s contract rate but instead a market rate of 
interest equal to the prime rate plus some small additional ‘risk factor’ to reflect the particular debtor’s level of 
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leave nothing to cope with mortgage arrearage or other things we have 
to pay under the plan. At the very least, it would be nice to be able to 
‘term-out’ such car loans with a reduced interest rate and not be limited 
to five years [the usual length of the Chapter 13 plan]. That might be 
more valuable than a repeal of 910-day protections on the valuation, 
in the long term, given the spiraling cost of new cars.29 
III. STUDENT LOANS 
Whether or not bankruptcy is the best vehicle with which to address the 
student loan problem, I think that most people would agree that the student-loan 
debt problem is a growing economic crisis that is currently in search of 
solutions.30 The student-loan crisis reminds me a lot of the underfunded pension 
crisis that was fueled by the passage of ERISA and the federal government’s 
guarantee of employer-sponsored defined-benefit pension plans.31 Both 
situations present classic examples of economic bubbles that are bound to burst. 
In my article on the federal pension guarantee, I called this pattern “deferred 
maintenance”—where someone gets a benefit now by making a promise to pay 
someone later—and moral hazard, since the federal government’s role as 
guarantor in both situations means that defined-benefit pensions were promised 
by employers and student loans were made by lenders that otherwise might not 
have been promised or made but for the existence of the solvent third-party 
guarantor.32 
In both cases, the federal government finally realized at some point in the 
process that it had overpromised and that it needed to do something to help 
manage its likely losses. In the pension arena, the scope of the defined-benefit 
pension guarantees by the federal Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
eventually had to be scaled back.33 With student loan guarantees, the federal 
government continues to struggle with how to eliminate participation by certain 
colleges and universities (often for-profit) whose graduates have historically low 
 
risk to the lender). 
 29 Email from Anonymous Consumer Bankruptcy Lawyer to author (Jan. 9, 2020) (on file with author). 
 30 See Daniel M. Johnson, What Will It Take to Solve the Student Loan Crisis, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 
23, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/09/what-will-it-take-to-solve-the-student-loan-crisis (estimating current student 
loan debt at just under $1.6 trillion). 
 31 See generally Daniel Keating, Pension Insurance, Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 
65 (1991). 
 32 Id. 
 33 See id. at 88–89. 
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repayment rates, while still keeping the program generally available to the next 
generation of college students.34 
The main limit of bankruptcy as a solution to either of these two federal 
financial crises, at least from the perspective of the federal treasury, is that 
bankruptcy fails to put any new money on the table. In theory, bankruptcy can 
be helpful to the debtor in each of these two situations—the employer with the 
underfunded defined-benefit pensions and the consumer with unpaid student 
loans—if it allows the debtor to transfer their liability onto the federal 
government’s guarantee. Thus, in bankruptcy a broader student-loan discharge 
would amount to a wealth transfer from each debtor who gets the student-loan 
discharge to federal taxpayers as a group. In the corporate pension arena, this 
has worked to some degree for corporations that were able to use chapter 11 
bankruptcy to discharge some or all of their defined-benefit pension liability and 
then emerge with a much cleaner balance sheet for the future.35 For individual 
debtors looking for similar relief in the student loan arena, the outcomes have 
been much less favorable, thanks to the current “undue hardship” standard for 
discharge that is found in § 523(a)(8).36 
I am inclined to favor Professor Martin’s proposal on student loan discharge, 
and I definitely favor it over a more universal nonbankruptcy loan forgiveness 
program such as that being proposed by certain presidential candidates.37 The 
biggest problem that I have with a nonbankruptcy loan forgiveness across the 
board is that it would sweep within its scope many debtors who could easily 
afford to repay their loans. I am thinking here of highly paid professionals who 
borrowed to attend medical school, law school, or business school. These 
wealthy debtors would potentially receive the same debt forgiveness as debtors 
who worked hard to earn degrees that were not marketable and who now struggle 
with limited incomes to repay their large student loan debts. One major 
advantage to Professor Martin’s proposal (unlike universal forgiveness 
programs outside of bankruptcy) is that it would require seven years of 
repayment by the debtor plus surrender of all the debtor’s non-exempt assets (or 
 
 34 See, e.g., Annie Nova, Bill Would Make For-Profit Colleges Ineligible for Federal Student Loans, 
CNBC (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/23/bill-would-make-for-profit-schools-inelgible-for-
financial-aid.html.  
 35 See, e.g., Keating, Moral Hazard, supra note 35, at 65 (describing the 1986 chapter 11 filing of the 
LTV Corporation). 
 36 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2019). 
 37 See Adam S. Minsky, How Do the Warren and Sanders Student Loan Forgiveness Plans Compare?, 
FORBES (June 27, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/adamminsky/2019/06/27/how-do-warrens-and-sanders-
student-loan-forgiveness-plans-compare/#5a8a4c318c4f (noting that Sanders’ plan is a total forgiveness plan 
whereas Warren’s plan has various limitations). 
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its equivalent value in chapter 13 plan payments) as the cost of receiving the 
student loan discharge.38 
The other benefit to Professor Martin’s proposal as compared to 
nonbankruptcy forgiveness programs is that it would probably be less costly to 
taxpayers. But even with Professor Martin’s proposal, my one hesitation in 
endorsing it without qualification is the uncertainty of its cost. Given the 
hundreds of billions of dollars in outstanding student loan debt, how much of 
that would get discharged under Professor Martin’s bankruptcy reform and thus 
get written off the federal treasury’s bottom line? That is one of those critical 
empirical questions for which we just don’t know the answer.  
On the subject of student loans, I want to close by sharing ideas that were 
sent to me by two of the people that I contacted in the bankruptcy field. One 
bankruptcy lawyer that I know suggested to me that the way to rein in the student 
loan crisis, at least going forward, is to require that colleges and universities 
where students attend must sign on as guarantors of any student loans taken out 
by their students.39 This would, he said, address the “Bennett Principle” 
mentioned in Professor Martin’s article. That is where former Secretary of 
Education William J. Bennett complained that colleges were able to raise their 
tuition at artificially high rates only because of the assurance that students could 
pay those higher tuition costs thanks to the federally guaranteed student loans.40 
While I appreciate how that might address the arguable moral hazard that 
universities have under the current system, I think that I had better not 
wholeheartedly support this idea, at least given the nature and identity of my 
current employer! 
Another of my respondents from the bankruptcy field thought that many 
debtors might be able to improve their current situation regarding their student 
loans if only they had appreciated prior to filing bankruptcy what rights they 
already had under income-driven repayment programs:  
I also think that a mechanism for communication between lenders and 
student loan debtors before bankruptcy would eliminate lawsuits in 
bankruptcy and in some instances the filing of bankruptcy cases in the 
first instance. All too often a debtor does not learn of (or understand) 
 
 38 Under chapter 13, the “best interests of creditors test” under § 1325(a)(4) says that no chapter 13 plan 
can be confirmed over a creditor’s objection if that creditor does not receive at least as much as the creditor 
would in a chapter 7 liquidation of the same debtor. And a chapter 7 liquidation of any debtor would require that 
the debtor give up all of their non-exempt property to pay pre-petition creditors. 
 39 Telephone Interview with Anonymous Consumer Bankruptcy Lawyer (Jan. 15, 2020). 
 40 Martin, Relevance, supra note 5, at 608. 
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nonbankruptcy student loan repayment options until after filing an 
adversary proceeding in his bankruptcy case and being connected with 
lender’s counsel.41 
IV. DISCHARGE HEARINGS 
I agree with Professor Martin that there is an unfortunate but significant 
psychological or shame-based aspect to the bankruptcy process, and that in a 
perfect world a debtor would have an opportunity to tell someone their side of 
the story. I truly believe that people get better and feel better when they have an 
opportunity to tell their story. Based on what I heard from my professional 
friends in the consumer bankruptcy field, however, it seems that the better forum 
in which a debtor can tell their story is not the former discharge hearing, but 
rather the offices of their own bankruptcy attorney. I received more than one 
impassioned response that roundly applauded the demise of the discharge 
hearing. 
One attorney who has been doing exclusively consumer bankruptcy filings 
for almost fifty years recalls:  
I well remember those [discharge] hearings. I used to send letters to 
other lawyers and offer to attend for them, meet their clients, and tell 
what was happening along with my clients, of course, at $10 a head. I 
always made an extra $40 that way. You had to attend the hearing with 
your clients, of course, as otherwise your clients would not understand 
what was going on and if there was a debt to be reaffirmed, you already 
had to be there lest things get confused. 
As a consequence, your clients lost two to four hours of work earning 
money, had to pay for parking and the lawyer had to charge for going, 
also. Total waste of time. I agree that folks need to feel good about 
what they are doing. But this is the job of the debtor’s attorney. You 
need to explain to folks that filing is designed to give them an 
opportunity for a fresh start. That the guys who drafted the 
Constitution, Thomas Jefferson, Ben Franklin, Jim Madison, and all 
the [founders] wanted the U.S. to be a place of fresh starts. That people 
like Harry Truman, Walt Disney, and others have filed. That you 
cannot walk forward in life while kicking yourself in the butt! 
If you do this, your clients will not be happy they are seeing you, 
obviously, any more than a person with cancer is happy to see the 
doctor, but they will be happy that they live someplace where folks 
can get a fresh start (unlike some places in the world) and will 
 
 41 Email from Anonymous Consumer Bankruptcy Lawyer to author (Jan. 14, 2020) (on file with author). 
KEATING_7.15.20 7/15/2020 4:01 PM 
640 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 36 
appreciate that brave men have gone to the death to keep it that way 
on a variety of levels, not just bankruptcy. Better this extra fifteen 
minutes in the office than wasting two to four hours of their time later 
plus pay extra fees for the lawyer to sit there trying to think of 
something else while the judge drones on.42 
Another lawyer with three decades in consumer bankruptcy practice echoed 
those sentiments about the discharge hearing: 
I agree a lot of my clients are relieved to finally be able to tell their 
story. A discharge hearing might, in the right circumstances, be a nice 
forum for them to celebrate their fresh start. But I think it’s likely to 
be a bad idea as implemented. First, if it’s mandatory, it will cost them 
time away from work. They can’t afford that. They just can’t. These 
are folks who are often working two jobs. They work a couple hours 
of their time to pay for parking downtown. And then give up a couple 
more hours to just be there. 
Second, there are just enough judges who think consumers ought to be 
punished for being bankrupt that I dread having my clients ever having 
to appear before them. (Not in [the Eastern District of Missouri] 
thankfully.) 
Third, I currently can tell most clients they only have to go to court 
once, they never even have to see the (fearsome) judge in most cases, 
and at the end they don’t have to go back down there to bend their knee 
and apologize to anyone to get their fresh start. They genuinely fear 
any public appearance as part of their bankruptcy case. Telling them 
they can keep their head down, collect this entitlement and move on 
with their life is what they crave. 
What we’re talking about here is folks need to have a sympathetic 
counselor. That’s my job, not [the bankruptcy judge’s]. I can usually 
look at an intake questionnaire of three pages and know what 
happened. Not the nitty-gritty details but the big picture. But I have to 
give them five to ten minutes to just tell their story and get it off their 
chests and then they’re ready to begin working with me. I agree with 
[Professor Martin] that they need it but I don’t think it belongs in the 
courthouse. Plus, if it’s a court hearing, lawyers ought to go. That’s an 
additional cost to the client that they cannot afford.43 
Finally, a former bankruptcy attorney who spent many years as a federal 
bankruptcy law clerk, as an attorney in private practice and then as an attorney 
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advisor for the bankruptcy court remembers her judge talking about these 
hearings and how perfunctory they were when they used to be required: 
Steps to force debtors to attend discharge hearings are not, in my 
opinion, practical nor would they be effective in giving debtors the 
desired feeling of being heard and encouraged on their discharge. First, 
courts do not have the capacity to conduct individual hearings on 
discharge so the process would become an exercise in convening a 
group and conveying a common message. Debtors would actually be 
burdened to take time from work to attend such a hearing. Rather, I 
think care for debtor concerns is best met by their counsel as a matter 
of legal ethics and duty to be responsive to clients. I do not know any 
instance when a debtor who wants to speak to the court has not been 
allowed to speak and when speaking has not been made to feel heard. 
Counsel simply needs to ask for such an opportunity at a scheduled 
hearing. Legislating care and compassion does not work.44 
V. EFFICIENCY 
Professor Martin did not focus much of her reform proposals on the 
increased time and cost that BAPCPA created as potential barriers to 
bankruptcy’s current relevance to the average consumer. Nevertheless, those 
were both common (if unprompted) themes of the comments that I received from 
the people I contacted who work in the consumer bankruptcy field. A number of 
respondents noted how the added costs of BAPCPA may have priced some 
potential consumer bankruptcy filers out of the market altogether. One of my 
bankruptcy judge respondents observed:  
[F]ilings are and have been down since 2005 for some of the reasons 
stated by Prof. Martin in this article, but there are also other reasons, 
such as limited lending by banks and other financial institutions and 
the increased cost of filing consumer bankruptcy (i.e. increase in 
attorney’s fees due to additional attorney work required under 
BAPCPA, cost for credit counseling and financial management 
courses).45 
An attorney with three decades of experience representing consumer debtors 
echoed those sentiments: 
I believe a growing impediment to relief—and thus making 
bankruptcy irrelevant to consumers—is the growing cost of it. 
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Structurally, BAPCPA created a tax payable to me for collecting a lot 
more data, providing more docs, and dealing with more risks. The 
AO’s last couple of revisions to the official forms have not exactly 
reduced that tax either. They’re horrendous and burdensome without 
any offsetting benefit at all. So one of the effects of that tax coupled 
with the decline of the middle class and the absence of disposable 
income is the problem of actually getting anything filed. Just calculate 
how many hours the median Missourian must work—effectively for 
me and the court—in order to get a case filed. Ignoring any other costs 
of their life. If we’re charging them $1,000 plus a $335 filing fee, it’s 
insurmountable for many lower-income folks without family or 
savings. Pro se or pro bono services are not able to cover the gap in 
affordability. And pro se systems are downright dangerous in places 
with weak exemptions like Missouri.46 
Another attorney respondent with almost five decades of practicing consumer 
bankruptcy law was even more blunt in his assessment of the inefficiencies 
brought about by BAPCPA: 
The first thing we should consider when making any changes in the 
law is how do we make it faster, cheaper, and easier. The current law 
has slowed things down and raised the cost of doing business greatly, 
all to no benefit to anyone. Fees have gone up from $175 to $750 a 
case and we, as lawyers, made more money when it was $175 than 
now and the clients are not getting any better results either!47 
A chapter 7 and chapter 13 standing trustee who handles hundreds of cases each 
year cited BAPCPA’s means test as creating new cost-heavy barriers for 
consumer debtors with no corresponding benefit to anyone in the bankruptcy 
system: 
I for one think that the Means Test is worthless. The idea behind the 
Means Test of course is to force the abusive debtor from chapter 7 into 
chapter 13. However, these days where you have 0% chapter 13 plans 
or chapter 13 plans where a small amount is paid to the unsecured 
creditors, forcing someone into chapter 13 really does not help the 
creditors but simply punishes the debtor. The old section 707(b) 
[dismissal for abuse of the bankruptcy process] was an effective tool 
to police the system. In fact, it seemed to me to give more leeway to 
the U.S. Trustee to pursue a 707(b) rather than the formulaic Means 
Test. In some jurisdictions the U.S. Trustee takes the position that if 
one passes the Means Test they will not look at a traditional 707(b). In 
addition, the Means Test is unfair in that there are different median 
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incomes and different standard exemptions from state to state. If we 
went back to the old system, I think there is more flexibility.48 
Besides the means test, the pre-bankruptcy credit counseling and post-
bankruptcy financial management classes required by BAPCPA were cited by 
many of my respondents from practice as needlessly adding to the time and cost 
of a typical consumer bankruptcy filing. 
One veteran consumer bankruptcy lawyer faulted the general “one size fits 
all” nature of such required courses as being not very helpful to most consumer 
debtors: 
I used to think [that more expansive consumer education would be 
useful], but the studies more recently seem to say that most such 
programs are simply not preparing consumers for the lending 
environment we’re in now. Some of the specialized programs show 
results—like the programs directed at new home buyers. I suspect that 
there’s good reason for this. Targeted education related to a specific 
loan product that someone is seriously thinking about using will get 
focused attention from the student. A discussion about how daily 
interest loans work and that it is a dangerous product, taken a couple 
years before the borrower walks into a friendly neighborhood finance 
store, was probably a complete waste of that person’s time. They won’t 
even recall what questions they should be asking. I don’t. And I’ve 
been doing this for 30 years. 
The same is true of most budgeting courses. The only people who can 
gain much from education about budgeting are high-income folks who 
somehow keep piling up credit card debt anyway because they have 
no conception of how to say ‘no’ to new fixed costs in their life. The 
low-income folks learn from hard, painful experience to budget or they 
go hungry. The middle class usually grasps the principles of budgeting 
but rarely have income that consistently keeps up with their 
status . . . they spend to try to maintain a standard of living that most 
of us consider reasonable. 
I just don’t think any education program I’ve heard about will really 
work unless it is focused on a desired transaction or specific goal. Then 
it seems to ‘take.’ But we just have not found the tools for broad 
consumer finance education yet. And I feel like such proposals will 
inherently be a taxpayer cost. In which case, you will have most cash-
strapped communities looking for ‘free’ programs which, in turn, will 
come gift-wrapped from the industry. And while I suspect Jamie 
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Dimon49 could probably be counted on to put together a largely 
unbiased program (although not recommending my services), I have 
very little expectation that Freedom Debt Relief (the biggest debt 
settlement operator) would miss the opportunity to market itself.50 
Another multi-decade practitioner also had little good to say about how these 
debtor education requirements have worked out in practice: 
The current requirement of two classes is an expensive total waste of 
time. Clients are much better buying shoes for the kids than paying for 
time-wasting classes. Also, they will get more benefit out of watching 
re-runs of Roseanne than spending two to four hours on the computer 
effectively being told they do not have enough money to live on. Also, 
the classes smack of cultural imperialism, I think, with ‘know-it-alls’ 
telling working people how to live their lives.51 
A bankruptcy judge echoed the sentiments of these two lawyers: 
[I believe that] other barriers to bankruptcy access, particularly for the 
average and marginalized consumer, [include] the pre-petition credit 
counseling requirement and barrier to discharge of the post-petition 
financial management requirement. Elimination of these two 
requirements should be included in any proposal to provide better 
access to the average consumer, in that these requirements can be 
detrimental to bankruptcy filers, often resulting in dismissal of cases 
shortly after filing or closing of cases without a discharge, and are an 
additional cost, requiring additional time by the debtor and they really 
serve no purpose.52 
A chapter 7 and chapter 13 standing trustee distinguished between the relative 
value of the pre-bankruptcy credit counseling requirement and the post-
bankruptcy financial management classes that debtors must take to qualify for 
discharge under BAPCPA: 
What I find from my clients and from debtors for whom I am their 
chapter 13 or chapter 7 trustee is that very little is attained by the 
debtors in pre-bankruptcy credit counseling. However, I have had a 
number of debtors comment that the post-bankruptcy financial 
management is of service. Accordingly, it seems to me that the pre-
bankruptcy credit counseling is doing nothing more than providing a 
logistic impediment for consumers to file bankruptcy and really doing 
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no good whereas the post-bankruptcy financial management actually 
has benefit.53 
One long-time bankruptcy lawyer disagreed with the others in my group of 
respondents on the costs and benefits of the education requirements, having 
concluded from his experience that probably the benefits justify the costs: 
In my opinion the BAPCPA-required classes for bankruptcy filing and 
for a discharge are not a barrier. They cost about $50 for both classes 
and you pay once—before you file. Debtors can take them online or 
over the telephone. I bet it takes 20 minutes for each class. I have had 
some debtor clients say that the class helps. It is not a total waste of 
time.54 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Martin’s article is a provocative and thoughtful exploration into 
the ways that the bankruptcy system could be improved to address some of the 
most vexing problems that our society faces today in an era of increasing wealth 
disparity. Although I did not agree entirely with all of her proposals for reform, 
even those with which I disagreed gave me new insights and new food for 
thought on issues that are clearly important to the overall bankruptcy system as 
it operates in practice today. Probably my biggest question about the overall 
theme of the article is whether bankruptcy, as opposed to broader nonbankruptcy 
solutions, is the most appropriate vehicle for addressing these systemic income 
and wealth imbalances that we face as a nation. As I suggested earlier in my 
response, the answer to that question is to a large extent an empirical one that 
depends on the circumstances and attributes of the typical consumer bankruptcy 
debtor. Whatever the empirical data might end up telling us about the likely 
efficacy of Professor Martin’s various proposals, I am confident that her article 
is an important contribution to the growing literature on how bankruptcy might 
be used to ameliorate certain of our country’s current economic inequities. 
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